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The *protest movements* in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s: convergences and divergences with the *May 68* movement in France. Memories and reflections

As a student in Philology (History, Romance Studies) and Political science at the Johannes Gutenberg-University in Mainz, the capital of the Rhineland-Palatinate in the Federal Republic of Germany, I took part in a meeting between young French and Germans in Dijon in February 1968, as part of a twinning arrangement between the universities of Mainz and Dijon. During an interview with the local press (1), the German delegation was invited to give its point of view on the student movement (Studentenbewegung) happening across the Rhine, the spearhead in the 1960s of a dissenting youth which, for the first time since the founding of the Federal Republic (1949), was bursting onto the political scene. Discussions focused not only on living and studying conditions but also on the ongoing politicisation of the universities. The rights and freedoms granted to us in the university residence halls, including mixed rooms and freedom of movement, were seen as our first conquest. An achievement still denied to French students. But they too were strongly contesting the internal regulations of the residence halls. On March 22, this refusal provoked a revolt at the Faculty of Letters and Humanities in Nanterre, that would set off the fire throughout France: the student protest would then converge with other social struggles to form the May 68 movement, which shook the State and society for two months.

In February 1968, when we met in Dijon, the universities across the Rhine had already been in turmoil for more than two years. But this was no reason for our French comrades to acknowledge their leadership in the field of protest. On the contrary: an activist from Dijon did not hesitate to criticise young Germans for "thinking too much and not acting enough" (2). These differences of opinion already refer to the structures and practices of militant action in place on both sides of the Rhine, in very different social contexts.

After its foundation in 1949, the Federal Republic did not see the emergence of an independent and demanding student union movement as in France. The young Germans found support from the political parties by forming a federation under

their patronage.

It is true that student unionism in France is weakened by its ideological divisions. In the ranks of the *March 22 Movement* which led to May 68, anarchist militants demanded the dissolution of the historic union, the *National Union of Students of France* (UNEF). They likened it to "an empty, bureaucratic shell (...) with corporatist demands" (3). However, with the benefit of historical hindsight, it is clear that the UNEF did indeed contribute to building groups where ideological differences (anarchists, communists, Trotskyites, Maoists) were expressed: "The students share an awareness of international issues, criticism of the mechanisms of selection and elimination from school that reproduce socio-economic inequality, and denunciation of the *psychiatrisation* of student problems" (4).

In the 1960s, the German students in turn gave themselves an autonomous union structure. If in Dijon, we recall that their movement did not weaken when it entered its third year, then to highlight the animating and coordinating function of the *Socialist German Student Union* (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund: SDS). In the immediate post-war period (1946), it established itself as a union independent of any party, while still remaining close to the SPD, the Social Democratic Party. Until 1961, when a resolution of incompatibility excluded SDS members and sympathisers from the SPD: after years of strong tensions within the party over rearmament, its anti-nuclear commitment, the abandonment of its Marxist-inspired programme (Bad Godesberger Programm, 1959) and above all relations with the Democratic Republic of Germany (DDR), the second State of the divided Germany (1949-1990), affiliated to the Soviet Union within the communist Eastern bloc (5).

After the break with the SPD, the SDS became the crucible of the new West German left, thanks in particular to its central position in the process of forming the *Extra-Parliamentary Opposition* (Außerparlamentarische Opposition - APO), which brought together members of the SPD, pacifists, unionists, left-wing intellectuals and liberal intellectuals. A heterogeneous alliance, determined to prevent the passing of *emergency laws* (Notstandsgesetze) by the federal parliament. These laws are intended to enable constitutional and federal bodies to act in a crisis situation such as a natural disaster, but also war or insurrection, by restricting fundamental freedoms.

Inspired by neo-Marxist theory and attracted by the Anglo-Saxon New Left, the SDS worked to build an opposition based on the "renovation of the socialist thought" (Gilcher-Holtey) and a break with the liberal societal model. From 1965 onwards, it presented itself as an *anti-authoritarian* organisation and rejected the dogmatism and dirigisme of real socialism in force in the countries of the Soviet bloc, while still retaining an orthodox wing that continued to campaign for cooperation with the DDR. Proponent of a prefigurative strategy in anti-capitalist

struggles, the SDS advocates modes of organisation and social relations marked by the idea of *self-management*, a basic element of its reflections on the functioning of future society.

To be relevant, the presentation and, even more so, the explanation of the German student movement in the **first part** of this study presuppose that they are placed in the context of the development of the young Federal Republic, which was focused on "prosperity for all" (*Wohlstand für alle*) and faced its first economic recession in 1966/1967. Let us therefore look at the genesis, character and ideology of the movement (1.1), before examining the objectives and strategies of the political and societal "change" which it advocated (1.2). (6)

After an overview of its particularities, should we conclude that the German student movement is similar to the revolt of French youth during the events of May-June 1968? Our meetings in Dijon rather reveal a lack of mutual understanding between the protesters of the two countries. In order to go beyond descriptive history and highlight the originality of the German student movement, we therefore suggest, for the **second part**, a comparison with the events of *May 1968* (7). First of all, we note the lack of interaction between the two *movements*, and even before 1968 between the "critical" currents that marked the extra-parliamentary left in Germany and France. This suggests that the two movements remain strongly circumscribed by the historical, political and social situation in each country. We therefore examine the differences in the institutional framework and societal context on both sides of the Rhine (2.1), before turning to the conception of "change" conveyed by the protest and its anchoring in the traditions of social struggles in both countries (2.2).

1.

Genesis, evolution and societal impact of the German student movement

The protest in the universities is *political*. It is considered that education and training, vectors of socialisation, are marked by a conformism that does not care to get rid of the legacy of Nazism and is not in line with the challenges of a society in search of a synthesis between modernity and social justice. Students and teachers call for structural reforms, in particular the opening of higher education to the disadvantaged social classes, innovative pedagogies as well as *participatory* management involving all actors in schools and universities.

The federal government became the target of protesters, as its policies clashed with their beliefs in democracy, the rule of law and international solidarity. This was

the case in December 1966, following the formation of a grand coalition government between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) and its willingness to pass *emergency laws*, against the background of growing opposition among its youth to the Vietnam War, which had been going on since 1963. Since the Federal Republic was a faithful ally of the United States, denouncing *American imperialism* and supporting the liberation movements of colonised peoples was a major mobilising issue for young Germans. They were inspired by the protests on American campuses, which began in 1964/65 at the Californian University of Berkeley.

With the emergence of students as actors of *civil society*, the years 1966-1969 proved to be a real turning point in post-war history. The university campuses were part of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO), a gathering of critical movements opposed to the emergency laws, some of which were *historic*, such as the "Campaign for Peace and Disarmament" (Easter marches). The slow pace of the legislative procedure for the vote on said laws, which had already been initiated in 1960 in the Federal assembly, created a favourable context for the spread of SDS ideas, the group behind the APO.

1.1

An anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist and anti-fascist movement

The "economic miracle" (Wirtschaftswunder) galvanised the early days of the Federal Republic (8) until its first economic crisis in 1966/67, which revealed cracks in its social model. The recession suddenly put the risk of unemployment at the top of the agenda of the government, politicians, employers and unions' organisations, and forced them to question the solidity of the foundations of the young West German democracy. As *human capital*, i.e. education, training and research, is one of the determining factors of economic growth, the malfunctioning of these sectors calls for an ambitious reform package, but this seems to be compromised by the fragility of political institutions. This is evidenced by the lack of countervailing power in the *Bundestag*, the federal parliament, against a grand coalition government. The opposition of the small Liberal Party (FDP), because of its small weight (barely 10% of the seats), renders any parliamentary control of the executive power advocated by the Constitution inoperative. Hence the emergence of an *extra-parliamentary opposition* (APO), led in particular by the SDS. It does not hesitate to assimilate the State and society to an authoritarian-like regime that covers the social inequalities produced by the economic system. This Marxist-inspired analysis is very popular and suggests that representative democracy is merely the superstructure of excessive capitalism.

By pushing for mass production and consumption (*Konsumterror*), it would expose the working population to exploitation and alienating working and living conditions. This analysis is reinforced by the theses of the Norwegian *peace researcher* Johann Galtung, whose influence is strong among students, who equates social injustice with a form of "structural violence" that prevents human development.

If in the then still bipolar world of the *East-West* cold war, a current of the SDS remained ideologically attached to the Marxist doctrine predominating in the countries of the Soviet bloc (*real socialism*), the majority of the protesters refused any form of dogmatism entrusting the direction of change to a political vanguard. Marked by the libertarian theories and critical thought of the Frankfurt School, illustrated by the dissemination of the texts of Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, the movement was resolutely *anti-authoritarian*. As a *counter-culturalist* movement, it experimented with alternative forms of life, in particular through self-management practices in education, teaching, crafts and services, living space, culture and leisure (9). The contours of an emerging counter-society, intended to promote individual and collective development, were strongly influenced by the psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich and his conception of the sexual revolution (10). *Anti-authoritarianism* proved to be the most durable current of the student movement. It preached the liberation of morals, the emancipation of women, the recognition of the rights of homosexuals as well as of non-procreative sexuality - trends that were soon to manifest themselves throughout the Western world. Referring in particular to the patriarchal and monogamous form of the family and the social character of neuroses, the founder of Freudo-Marxism linked any form of cultural revolution to the condition of a *sexual revolution* - the aspiration to *happiness* being hardly compatible with the ideology and functioning of capitalist society.

These anti-capitalist movements also wanted to be anti-fascist, considering National Socialism as a specific expression of German capitalism. Young people did not hesitate to call out their parents to account by questioning them about their behaviour under the Third Reich. Among the personalities and even high-ranking representatives of the State who were forced to confess their past - their membership to the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) - was the then Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU). Between December 1966 and October 1969, he led the grand coalition government. The case of this lawyer by training confirms the APO's thesis that the German justice system was badly denazified (11).

The confrontation between the generations took on violent overtones. It revealed the fragility of a State that is not yet capable of managing conflicts other than through police repression. On June 2, 1967, a student was killed in West Berlin during a demonstration against the visit of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was targeted for his pro-American dictatorial regime. The rise in

political tension was fuelled by the hate campaign unleashed by parts of the tabloid press against the young protesters. On April 11, 1968, an extreme right-wing gunman, a reader of the Springer Group press, shot and seriously wounded student leader Rudi Dutschke, triggering a wave of almost insurrectionary agitation in West Berlin and other university towns. Dutschke died in 1979 as a result of this assassination attempt. These events forced a questioning of the conception of power and counter-power in the young Federal Republic, marked by the emergence of *civil society* as an agent of change.

1.2

Reform or rupture? The actors of a policy of *change*

For Norbert Elias, the country is going through an identity crisis due to a split between the post-war elites and the youth. According to this writer and sociologist, the former still have points of reference to the political and historical order of the pre-war period and of the years 1939-1945, without, however, facing the Nazi past. In contrast to them, young people would supposedly be devoid of this type of values and use Marxism to "oppose the silence of their parents" (12). But the reference to Marxist doctrine does not lead to a strategy of rupture common to all the currents of the student movement and the APO: at no time is the *class struggle* set up as a sine qua non condition for social change. In the face of "structured violence" - anchored, according to John Galtung, in institutions, norms and procedures - a minority of protesters considered the use of *counter-violence* to be legitimate. It was influential in the SDS, which was deeply divided on the question of armed fight and ended up scuttling itself in 1970. While equating the state's monopoly on the use of force with a *rationalisation* of violence - fuelling perceived social injustice and thus frustration and anger - the founder of Science for Peace advocated peaceful conflict resolution through *non-violent resistance*.

Like so many previous social movements, the protest in the Federal Republic was thus divided between advocates of a reformist policy of *change* and supporters of revolutionary strategies (13). This polarisation led to, in 1968 - the year in which so many hopes were raised - the greatest disappointments which caused the demise of the APO. After the (futile) mobilisation of citizens against the emergency laws, the protest ran out of steam, also as a result of the setbacks suffered by the reform movements in neighbouring countries, particularly the violent repression by Warsaw Pact troops of the *Prague Spring*, which had the appearance of "socialism with a human face" in Czechoslovakia. According to the political scientist Wolfgang Kraushaar, the failure of the protest movement in the Federal Republic was already evident at the end of the summer of 1968: "The protest movement had lost its cohesion, the exaggerated expectations had negative

repercussions on the internal structures of the militant organisations, triggering conflicts that could often only be resolved by splits and exclusions" (14). The movement indeed broke up into three major trends:

- First of all, many of the protesters opted for the "march through the institutions", to use Rudi Dutschke's phrase. By joining the established parties in the Bundestag, the federal parliament, they pledged to contribute to the democratisation of the system in order to impose a policy of social progress (15).

- Then, other protesters joined the tiny *German Communist Party* (DKP), under Soviet obedience, or led Maoist- and Trotskyite-like far-left groups in their attempts to establish themselves, particularly in the workplace. Although they had *revolutionary* ambitions, these groups had little political impact, failing to win the 5% of seats in a regional or federal election required by the Constitution to enter parliament.

- Finally, refusing to become involved in a facade of a democracy, many protesters withdrew into the private sphere, into networks of anti-authoritarian communities, in search of personal fulfilment and by displaying their international solidarity with peoples in struggle. "It was a general stampede," recalls Dieter Kunzelmann, co-founder in 1967 of the first community with libertarian overtones (*Kommune 1*) in West Berlin: "everyone went on a journey - within themselves, to India and its gurus, to Italy where class struggles were raging, to the national liberation movements of South and Central America, or to Palestine" (16). Intensifying the confusion and reversals, the year 1968 not only brought about a demarcation between the different political currents, but also the opposite, an unprecedented synthesis: we witnessed an astonishing mixture of ideas combining the leftist belief in *spontaneity* and *direct democracy* with Marxist, Maoist and even Stalinist references.

If the year is considered to be the prelude to the "great confusion" (Kunzelmann), it is above all because the small groups that emerged from the protest began to radicalise and ended up wanting to impose change through armed fight. This is the case of the *Red Army Faction* (Rote Armee Fraktion: RAF) which appeared in 1970. Advocating the "class struggle", it saw itself as an integral part of the "metropolitan guerrilla war of the international proletariat against the imperialist bourgeoisie" (Ulrike Meinhof) (17). Focusing in particular on society's outcasts, it adopts the thesis of the Marxist philosopher and sociologist Herbert Marcuse that in advanced capitalism, marginal groups (Randgruppen) are in a position to represent persistent social antagonisms.

However, it was not the RAF and other groups identified with left-wing terrorism that initiated the discussion of armed fight in the Federal Republic. As early as September 1967, the XXII^e Delegates' Meeting of the SDS in Frankfurt am Main spread the concept of urban guerrilla warfare. It transposes Che Guevara's *foco*

theory from the countryside to the city as well as from the Third World to the metropolises of the First World (18). The conditions are "ripe for revolutionary action". This is the conviction of SDS leaders Rudi Dutschke and Hans-Jürgen Krahl. For them, it is only a "question of will and determination" to seize the political opportunities offered by the international context. Two phenomena seem to them to be inseparable, despite their geographical and historical distance: the Middle East conflict on the one hand, and the series of protest movements in Europe on the other (19).

If, in the multi-faceted struggles against the new *fascism* (capitalism, bourgeois society, police repression, US imperialism), the RAF and the other *desperados* can hardly be seen as part of the historical continuity of the struggles of the 1960s, it's because neither their vision nor their strategy, based on subversive action and *armed fight*, reflects the aspirations and practices of the movements of the time. On the other hand, other currents rightly claim to be part of the protest heritage: the *new social movements*, with feminist, anti-nuclear and environmental overtones. They are converging on the involvement of civil society in the system of representative democracy. By becoming an "inescapable factor of domestic politics" (Hans-Magnus Enzensberger), these movements are however hardly inspired by the conception of *politics* proper to the established system. They consider it to be too far removed from the concerns of the citizens, and therefore prefer to work at the local and regional level. This is especially true of the thousands of "citizens' initiatives" (*Bürgerinitiativen*), the most relevant expression of the new social movements. Far from merely pointing out the dysfunctions of representative democracy and putting pressure on policy-makers to remedy them, these citizens' groups go so far as to explore alternative forms of living and working. They are proving innovative in areas such as crafts, agriculture, urban planning and energy production. As their operations can cover subsistence activities, the distinction - marked by Marxist theory - between productive and reproductive work becomes obsolete. Consequently, the dogma of the *working class* as a productive force and motor of *change* also became obsolete, beaten down by the post-war demographic and social changes brought about by the *economic miracle*, the period of high growth (still ongoing in the 1960s and only coming to an end with the oil crisis of 1973). In other words, the vision of a bipolar society conceived around the opposition between *capital and labour* as an intangible fact, inscribed in the nature of *capitalism*, is fading in favour of a pluralist image in which the middle strata or middle class emerge as new actors of *change*. These movements converged in 1980 to create a new type of party, the *Greens* (*Die Grünen*). Inspired by the anti-authoritarian, pacifist and *alternative* ideas of previous decades, its founders committed themselves to operating according to the principles of grassroots democracy and to campaigning for social justice and environmental protection.

With its particularities, the protests in the Federal Republic of Germany have

obvious points of convergence with the events of May-June 1968 in France. The conclusion is that in both countries, the protests have as their background the crises of the university system and lead, outside the campus, to *social movements* with destabilising effects for the political system or at least questioning the values on which it is based. The obvious differences in the genesis and scope of the mobilisation in the two countries can be explained by the specificities of the *national context* and, first of all, of its higher education system. In France - to return to the detonator of *May 68* - the centralisation of the university administration, as the historian Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey reminds us, makes the rules for visiting residence halls dependent on a ministerial decision. This had the effect of "politicising the most marginal student demands and protests", thus creating "the conditions for turning university affairs into affairs of state in a very short time frame" (20). On the German side, on the other hand, the federalism of the education system and the broad autonomy of the higher education institutions prevented any *immediate* politicisation of the conflicts, i.e. delayed the intervention of the federal government in university affairs.

Insisting therefore on other differences between the German and French movements to better explain their lack of convergence and interaction.

2.

The lack of interaction between French and German protesters

In the early 1960s, there was little dialogue between the critical currents of the two countries via journals, writings and universities. On the other side of the Rhine, there was a limited breakthrough of the French Surrealism and the Situationist International. By adopting their theses on consumer society, the *commodity-man* and the totalitarian management of daily life (Guy Debord), the *Subversive Aktion* group was inspired by the situationists from 1962 onwards: by their conception of a "total and permanent revolt (...) as an explosion of the creative being" and of "daily subversion (...) as an experience of emancipation" (21). Criticizing situationism as an existentialist revolt "without revolutionary value" (22), the *internationalists* of the group (including Rudi Dutschke) soon turned away from the French postulate and turned towards the American-style protest against the war in Vietnam. The German student movement thus borrowed its emancipatory aims from the American and Dutch *provos* (their first emulators in Europe) (23), particularly their notions of *participatory democracy* and *direct action*.

It was not until February 1968 that these ideas permeated France, following the

Vietnam Congress of February 17-18, 1968 in West Berlin. Knowing each other only through indirect channels, the German and French protest groups made their first contacts here, i.e. just at the time of our Franco-German meeting in Dijon. In West Berlin, the French discovered the SDS's fighting tactics, which it had borrowed from the action practices of the *Students for a Democratic Society* in the United States in 1965 in their opposition to the Vietnam War. When faced with the authorities in France, they now used the tactics of surprise they had learned in February: "chopped slogans, clapping hands, jumping around to the rhythm of Che-Che Guevara, banners in letters of fire stretched across the road" (24). Franco-German solidarity seemed to be well underway. On April 2, Karl-Dietrich Wolff, one of the leaders of the SDS, supported the *March 22 movement* in Nanterre. He affirmed that the objectives of the students in struggle were the same on both sides of the Rhine. On April 13, after the assassination attempt against Rudi Dutschke, there were demonstrations in Paris against the press of the tycoon Springer and against the draft emergency laws. On May 24, the refoulement at the Franco-German border of Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a German national and one of the leaders of the May movement, triggered cross-border demonstrations of solidarity, preparing the clandestine repatriation of the undesirable, accused of "compromising public order" (25). But this was not the prelude to a phase of *interaction* or even *transnationality* between the German and French protest movements: all in all, cooperation between the militants of the two countries remained limited, rarely involving joint actions. It was only in the 1970s, with the rise of the feminist, anti-nuclear, environmental and peace movements, that bilateral coordination structures emerged (26).

The lack of Franco-German convergence in the 1960s can be explained first of all by the fact that the movements were circumscribed by the historical, political and social situation in each country: "Revolutionary ideas, concepts and forms of action", observes the historian Christiane Kohser-Spohn, "first had to pass through the filter of national particularities before being adapted beyond and within borders" (27).

2.1

Societal context and institutional framework of protest movements

In **France**, the authoritarian regime of General de Gaulle and the Constitution of the V^e Republic (1958) were strongly questioned ("Ten years, enough"). After having fulfilled his historic mission of putting an end to the Algerian War (1954-1962) and thus to a conflict that was tearing France apart, the President of the Republic was considered unfit to launch a policy of reforms that took into account

the socio-economic and demographic changes of the years of strong growth underway (*Trente Glorieuses* 1946-1975). This failure was encouraged by the constitutional revision of 1958. It established a semi-presidential regime, albeit without calling into question the parliamentary system: it strengthened executive power through the person of the Head of State, while limiting, under the guise of rationalisation, the role and influence of the legislative power (Senate, National Assembly, referendum).

May '68 reflected a social upsurge that was incomparably broader than in Germany, when workers joined students and teachers in struggle, and the left-wing parties acted as political mediators by proposing a republican and citizen-based governmental alternative. The *general strike* of May 13 symbolised this desire to break with the established powers. Paralyzing the country following the occupation of universities and factories, it provoked an unprecedented political and societal crisis that almost rang the death knell of the Gaullist regime. Admittedly, following the dissolution of Parliament by the President, the new elections resulted in a crushing defeat for the Communists, the Socialists (SFIO) and the small *Unified Socialist Party* (PSU) of the new left, and the return of the conservative majority. However, encouraged to define their *governmental projects*, these parties now placed themselves in the perspective of a credible alternative to Gaullist power. This approach led to the victory of the left-wing parties in the 1981 presidential and legislative elections.

In the **Federal Republic**, activists of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition mobilised in June 1968 against the adoption of emergency laws by the *Bundestag*, the federal parliament. They saw this legislation as a preventive measure that constituted an authoritarian state. The death of the student Benno Ohnesorg, who was shot by a police officer during a demonstration against the Shah of Iran on June 2, 1967, was interpreted as a *political* murder. The bill recalls the excesses of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) due to the exceptional (dictatorial) powers granted to the President of the Reich. The exercise of these powers "in a manner increasingly hostile to democratic pluralism and fundamental freedoms" played a decisive role in the collapse of the Republic and the rise of the National Socialist regime (28). To give the executive full powers in the event of an internal or external crisis was, for the APO, to ignore the lessons of Weimar and to deny the constitutional causes of the rise of National Socialism. Opposition to the emergency laws was therefore framed by a broad reflection on the function of the *bourgeois State* and the foundations of *capitalist society*. This is not the case in France, where the theme of fascism is "not at the heart of the interrogation of bourgeois capitalist society" (29): there is no reference to the Vichy regime - this "charismatic dictatorship" (Henry Rousso) under Philippe Pétain born of the defeat of 1940 and remaining the ally of Nazi Germany until August 1944.

In the Federal Republic, the movement seemed "more politicised, more theoretical

and more reflexive" (Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey) than in France. But by interpreting the death of a student in West Berlin as a clear sign of a policy of repression anticipating future emergency legislation, the APO limits its room for manoeuvre: it fixes the alliance around a project essentially oriented towards the *defence* of established democratic structures. As the only common denominator of the heterogeneous currents of the *extra-parliamentary opposition*, its approaches do not converge towards a struggle for *another Republic*, already preventing its transformation into a party of the *new left*. In contrast to the protest movement in France, the APO does not provoke a polarisation of the political landscape nor a governmental crisis. At no point does it manage to "break the partisan consensus on which the grand coalition was based" (30), because of its weak foothold in the federal parliament: the internal opposition against the SPD and the few liberal deputies hostile to the emergency legislation do not carry much weight in the *Bundestag* vote.

In France, as in the Federal Republic, Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey believes that the objectives of the protest are defined only gradually in the course of the action and thanks to the relay of the supporting groups that, "each in their own way, give structure to the discontent and the protest actions" (31). It is indeed clear that the ideas and concepts of *change*, and even the traditions of social struggle, are not the same on the two sides of the Rhine. This of course complicates the *interaction* between protesters from both countries.

2.2

Ideas and strategies for *change*, traditions of social struggles

In **France**, the events of May-June 1968 are often referred to as the *largest* social movement of the last century. They challenged traditional institutions (including the family, education and the Church), attacking above all - from the company to the Presidency of the Republic - the principle of *authority*: the events expressed "the power of the people against all forms of power (...) which were despised and denied" (32). With anti-authoritarian and libertarian overtones ("it is forbidden to forbid"), the movement conveyed the ideas of *self-management* and *participatory democracy*. It was to have a lasting impact on French society and political life, accelerating changes in mentalities, particularly regarding work, the environment and the role of women. Its many manifestations - often confused or even contradictory, sometimes violent, but also playful and festive - complicate the typological classification of the movement. With its barricades, strikes and factory occupations, the historian Michel Winock places *May '68* in the "French revolutionary tradition". If he insists on the *diversity* of the movement, it is to explain the extent and depth of the *crisis* in Gaullian France: "It was at the same

time a student revolt, it was a revolutionary movement on the part of small groups that were not unified, it was a social crisis with an unprecedented strike movement, it was a political crisis, and on top of all that it was a cultural revolution" (33). But the heterogeneity of the movement explains the difficulties of its components in situating themselves in relation to a common political and societal *project*, thereby restricting their demands to short-term categorical claims. The movement therefore did not formally give itself a coordination structure comparable to that of the APO in the Federal Republic, however short-lived it was.

At the beginning, the meeting between students and workers was considered by the union organisations not as an alliance but as a simple action of "punctual solidarity". The *critical event* (Pierre Bourdieu) which provoked the support of wage earners and public opinion for the student movement was the night of the barricades in Paris, from May 10 to May 11, followed by the general strike of May 13 (34). The particularity of the movement remains, however, its *spontaneity*. The wave of factory occupations from May 14 onwards was launched in a State enterprise by a group of young workers who decided on their own to stop working and occupy their company. This action gave rise to a movement which gave a new vision to workers' struggles: that of *self-management*. It is understood as an anti-authoritarian and anti-hierarchical approach to company management that frees up the creativity of the staff. Although no one seriously dares to imagine the implementation, or even the legal and constitutional forms of a society based on *generalised self-management*, this utopia nevertheless has an ideological impact on the trade union and political world: after the universities, it is the turn of companies to be *democratised*. *Self-management* proved to be an aspiration shared by some of the components of the protest movement. Synthesising its anti-authoritarian, anti-State and anti-hierarchical impulses for an alternative societal *vision*, the concept allowed the socialist current to distance itself ideologically and strategically from the principle of *democratic centralism* inspiring the French Communist Party (PCF) and the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) (35).

In 1968, the PCF and the CGT rather expected a social movement that suited them, going through the classic process of collective bargaining. Expressing, according to them, a general malaise and a desire for reform, the *alliance* in the street was not considered to be a desire to *break with capitalism*. They therefore refuse any *revolutionary* allegation that the protest is spilling over to the workers. Threatened both by the spontaneity and anarchist sensitivity of the movement and by the adventurism of *pseudo-revolutionary* leftists in its ranks (Trotskyites and pro-Chinese convinced of the *revolutionary* role of the workers betrayed by the established left), the PCF and CGT feared for their strategy of peaceful conquest of power. The label of *leftist* refers to the international context: "The PCF is worried about the schism which divides the communist movement around the conflict between China and the Soviet Union. Added to this was the emergence

of Guevarism in the mid-1960s, linked to the Cuban experience, which revalued the armed fight in relation to the peaceful fight" (36). Resolutely reformist, the PCF and CGT bet, in the current phase of strong growth, on the state as a regulator: its conquest was to make it possible to inflect "the mechanisms of intervention in a direction favourable to the working world" (37). This strategy was implemented through the *Union of the Left*, an electoral alliance founded between 1972 and 1977 on a *common government programme*, but which did not result in a victory at the ballot box. If these two major forces of the left ended up integrating the contestation, it was to channel it towards classic conflict solutions and the electoral process. Majority and minority unions indeed succeeded in extracting concessions from the government on wages, working conditions and relations. In application of the Grenelle talks (May 25-27), they obtained, in particular, the recognition of the *trade union section* in the company and the generalisation of collective bargaining (the key element of the German social model!). These achievements went hand in hand with the readjustment of the education system and other structural reforms.

If, therefore, in the post-May period, there are changes in the air, these are still underway in Gaullist France. In other words, the institutional system took up the challenge of contestation. By equating the PCF during the campaign for the legislative elections of June 23 and 30 (following the dissolution of the *National Assembly*) with the "subversive and totalitarian threat" weighing on France, the conservatives and their allies deliberately forgot that the PCF was rather a party of order which, together with the CGT, contributed to the easing of social tensions by directing the *politics of the street* towards negotiated solutions and the electoral process.

Far from claiming to be the heir to the social movement of May-June 1968, the *new left* is struggling to emerge as a new political actor. It remained fragmented into a host of small rival parties and groupings whose ideological heterogeneity prevented any consensus around a vision of change alternative to that of the classical left. After the mobilisation had run out of steam in June and July, the working world in turn experienced the re-establishment of established power relations. The representative monopoly of the unions was maintained. The re-institutionalisation of the traditional model of collective bargaining did not involve any major concession to the *participatory* and *self-management* ideas in vogue during the protest (38).

Let us note the simultaneity of events on both sides of the Rhine that marked the beginning of the debacle of protest: on May 30, 1968, on the very day that, after the announcements of a dissolution of parliament and the organisation of new elections, General de Gaulle called for a demonstration in support of his policy, the parties of the grand coalition government voted for emergency laws in Germany. They thus deprived the APO of the conflict that had functioned as an

integrator of its heterogeneous components.

In the **Federal Republic**, the protest does not extend to the working world. However, the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund: DGB) and its federations are opposed to the draft emergency legislation, which has been in the *Bundestag* since 1960. The unions fear for their autonomy and freedom of action because of the restrictions it entails, particularly on the rights of coalition and assembly. But they are divided on the strategy to prevent the legislative process: the DGB is counting on the veto of the Social Democrats (SPD) in parliament, while the powerful metal industry union *IG Metall* and other federations are opting for all-out opposition, that could go as far as including *political* strikes. This is a minority position, but one that has been strengthened in trade union circles by the SPD's change of direction: instead of continuing to reject emergency laws, the party is now aiming only to amend them. The trade union opposition was supported by the SDS, which was determined to give impetus to the APO by mobilising the universities through *congresses* and local *action committees*.

Inspired by the Anglo-American *New Left* model, the SDS thus failed to make the APO the ferment of a socialist opposition to the left of the SPD, which was unable to go beyond the stage of a *defensive* alliance - with the safeguarding of the *democratic* achievements of the Federal Republic as the only unifying element of its disparate components. Unlike the Gaullist government in France, the *grand coalition* did not deviate from its political course once it had been reassured that the SPD would adhere to the legislative process. With the ratification of the emergency laws by the *Bundestag* on May 30, 1968, the collective identity of the APO, cemented by its opposition to the legislation, was shattered: the trade unions withdrew from the *Emergency Committee for Democracy* (Kuratorium *Notstand der Demokratie*), which was immediately dissolved; two years later, the other major component, the *Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament* (formerly *Campaign for Disarmament*) and above all the SDS itself scuttled themselves, discouraged by dissension over strategic issues, especially the use of violence in politics. The other groups that emerged from the break-up of the alliance continued their militant action (in the universities, until the early 1970s), but in disarray without converging into a movement comparable to that of the APO.

The division of trade unionism over the emergency laws reveals the weak anchoring of the protest in the working world. The vast majority of workers, who benefited from the period of strong post-war growth (which was still ongoing, despite the temporary economic downturn of 1966/1967), remained confident in the virtues of the political and socio-economic system of the Federal Republic. Supported by trade unions rebuilt after the war according to the Anglo-Saxon

trade union model, they enjoyed (until the crisis of 1974/1975) substantial wages, working conditions and social benefits, thanks in particular to the social partnership, based on regular negotiations between workers' and employers' organisations. In contrast to France, *social dialogue* implies a more direct participation of employees in the management of their establishments (co-management) and in the management of companies (co-determination).

If in France, according to a particularly fiery Jean-Paul Sartre, in 1968 "the sons of the bourgeoisie united with the workers in a revolutionary spirit" (39), in the Federal Republic, on the other hand, a strong aversion against the student protesters was manifested in the companies. It is true that after the break of social-democracy with Marxism (1959), the doctrine of *class antagonism* faded away in the workplace. But a feeling of distrust permeated by a hint of class consciousness towards the university persisted: with the vast majority of students coming from affluent backgrounds and the working classes remaining largely under-represented, the Alma mater was seen as a reflection of persistent *social inequalities*. The strong influence of economic liberalism on wage earners is blamed by the far left on Germany's *recent history*: the crushing of the "memory of revolutionary workers' movements by Nazism" (40). As a result, there is an emerging tendency in the ranks of the protesters to see the students themselves as "substitute actors for the working class" and "emancipatory forces in society" (41). That is an interpretation suggested by sociologists such as Charles Wright Mills who analyse social relations in their complexity, even focusing on the mutation of the *revolutionary subject*. Thus, Herbert Marcuse sees the coincidence of two developments as a necessary condition for social transformation: the emergence, alongside the *working class* as an *objective* factor of the *revolution*, of new *subjective* factors such as students and the ghetto population (42).

Under the impact of *May '68*, in the Federal Republic, the time had come for the return of the *proletariat* as a social actor. The image of France in struggle, the mobilisation around *self-management* and therefore an innovative concept going beyond simple material demands, certainly after the disappointing campaign against the emergency laws, reminded the German protesters of the limits of their own action. But France also inspired ideas: from May 20, the students of West Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, following the example of the Sorbonne, occupied the universities as well, in order to turn them into a coordination place of *active resistance* based on *unity of action* with the workers. Even if the latter were only a few thousand to show their solidarity, the affirmation of the principle of *unity* took on a high symbolic value for the dogmatic currents (43).

The reorientation towards the *class struggle* determined the final phase of the APO, and (after its dissolution) the start of the 1970s. However, the emergence of students and intellectuals as communist *cadres* with Leninist, Trotskyist and especially Maoist tendencies (K-Gruppen) in the companies was short-lived and

heralded the decline of the *new left*: extremely doctrinaire, it had little credibility and, in any case, was too divided to make a political breakthrough and obtain representation in the federal and regional parliaments.

Are these currents still inspired by the *model* of “France in struggle”, whose fascination for German protesters is evident in the abundant literature on the events of the *Pariser Mai*?

3.

The entry of civil society into *politics*

Opinions differ on the impact of May '68 on the West German protest movement and on the New Left in the early 1970s. Christiane Kohser-Spohn reports the conclusions of Bernd Rabehl, one of the student leaders in West Berlin, who, already in 1976, during a congress on the aftermath of *May '68*, regretted that the French movement no longer had any involvement in the Federal Republic. The focus on China, Italy and other *model* countries rather than on France was, in his opinion, a political error with serious consequences: "We have succumbed to Leninism in its various forms". He asks why the intelligentsia in Germany did not make more use of the May '68 *model*, with its wealth of innovative ideas and practices: "Incomprehensible as it may be, the French events played only a secondary role in the German intellectual movement (...). The student movement was so narrow-minded ! (...). Why didn't the French movement play this role? In that country, the Communist Party (...), the union movement (...), the bourgeois system (...), the bourgeois ideology (were) in crisis (...). We did not observe any of this, yet it could have been the starting point we were so much looking for in '68" (44).

The hypothesis of a "French situation" (Hans-Magnus Enzensberger) in the Federal Republic does not seem very credible to Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, as the orientations of the movement in France do not lend themselves to a pure and simple transposition to the German context. Firstly, because the French concept of *self-management* is opposed to the model of *co-management* which the German unions claim. Secondly, because the APO does not have in the unions "relays from the new left capable of giving shape, through direct actions, company occupations and therefore through mobilisation from below, to another strategy of transformation and another participation project" (45). But even in France, not all the confederations entrusted the task of rethinking the renovation of trade union action to *1968ers* - especially the CGT, the main force with the PCF of the *old* left. It rejected *self-management* as an idea that would bring about social change, which it considered as a vision devoid of concreteness, constitutionally and legally

elusive, which it assimilates to a "hollow formula" (46).

Based on various theoretical contributions and historical experiences, the *self-management utopia* was supported by a trade unionism of Christian origin (CFDT) and a socialist current in search of renewal, in order to give a "political perspective to the libertarian aspirations of the post-May period". With the revival of economic liberalism from the second half of the 1970s, the vision changed connotations: *self-managers* now intended to "socialise liberal values and concepts (free enterprise, the market, responsibility, innovation, etc.) in order to reinvent a modern democratic socialism" (47).

Although opinions differ on the social value and societal impact of the protest movements of the 1960s, it is clear that they marked the first appearance of *civil society* on the political scene of their countries after World War II. In view of the many social, environmental and anti-globalisation struggles of our time, we have no hesitation in asserting that **civil society**, now an *agent of change*, has more influence than ever on political and economic *decision-makers*. It still makes extensive use of street demonstrations and other types of action that protesters used to take. But since then, protest has been diversified and enriched by the multiplication and refinement of the tools of control and pressure available to citizens in the digital age. Unlike the movements of the 1960s, which severely lacked dialogue and interaction, today's social networks allow for coordinated cross-border actions, adapted to the international dimensions of political and economic structures, especially with European integration and globalisation, developments that lead to an increasing interdependence of countries.

According to some, another message of the 1960s movements is the "emergence of the We"(48), the realisation that individual fulfilment depends on *collective solidarity*. It can indeed be argued that they contributed to the *democratisation of politics*. Through their autonomous and self-managed *citizen* actions - the so-called "Bürgerinitiativen" - they injected a dose of *direct democracy* into the representative political system that was in danger of eroding. This process was initiated in the Federal Republic, as in France, by the failure of the dogmatic currents of the *new left* that had emerged from the protests: after they had run out of steam, many activists ended up joining the *new social movements*. In the 1980s, these movements converged on the creation of ecological and *alternative* parties. These were initially "anti-system" parties, but after a pragmatic transformation, as in the Federal Republic, they became durably established on the political scene (49). While in both countries, the electoral growth of the *Greens* contributed to the weakening of the so-called *rallying* parties (Volksparteien), marked by the erosion of their social base; across the Rhine, they became essential partners in government coalitions at federal and regional level.

Notes

1. See *Les Dépêches de Dijon*, February 21, 1968, p. IV
2. Ibid.
3. Jean-Pierre Duteil, former member of the March 22-Movement, quoted in *Libération*, March 21, 2008, 'La LIBE des étudiants', p. 39
4. Vincent Lucy, Geoffroy Mannet in *Libération* of March 21, 2008, 'La LIBE des étudiants', p. 38
5. Created after the Second World War, in 1949, in the Soviet occupation zone, following the foundation of the Federal Republic on the territory of the American, British and French occupation zones, the DDR considers itself a *people's democracy* - a term derived from the communist political lexicon to distinguish the Soviet bloc States from the liberal democracies. The existence of the two German States was consolidated by their integration into the Western and Eastern blocs. As Germany remained a major issue in the *Cold War*, tensions crystallised around Berlin. A crisis between the Allies that began in 1958 ended with the construction of the *Wall* in 1961. The SDS became uncontrollable and was rejected by the SPD, especially because it was accused of being infiltrated by collaborators of the DDR's *political police, intelligence, espionage and counter-espionage service* (STASI).
6. We repeat here the essence of our discussion of the German student movement in the introduction to the collective work edited by Gius Gargiulo and myself: *Terrorismes - L'Italie et l'Allemagne à l'épreuve des "années de plomb" (1970-1980) : réalités et représentations du terrorisme*, Paris (Houdiard-Editeur) 2008, p. 27 ff. (historical-political references). The overview of the 1960s is certainly based on personal memories from my student years, but it is largely inspired by the research on the *Studentenbewegung* and in particular by the works of Wolfgang Kraushaar: *1968 - Das Jahr, das alles verändert hat*, Munich (Piper), 1998; *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur*, Hamburg (Hamburger Edition), 2000; *Die 68er-Bewegung international - Eine illustrierte Chronik 1960-1969*, t. I-IV, Stuttgart (Klett-Cotta) 2018. See also Niall Bond: *Allemagne 68*, in *Histoire@Politique* 2008/3 (No. 6), p. 2 ff; <https://www.cairn.info/revue-histoire-politique-2008-3-page-2.htm> (Retrieved on January 10, 2021)
7. A source of inspiration for us are above all the comparative studies of the protest movements in the Federal Republic and in France presented by Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey in her books 'Die Phantasie an die Macht'. *Mai 68 in Frankreich*, Frankfurt a. M. (Suhrkamp stw) 1995, 2. Aufl. 2001; *Die 68er Bewegung. Deutschland - Westeuropa - USA*, München (Beck) 2001, 4. Aufl. 2008; *1968. Eine Zeitreise*, Frankfurt a. M. (Suhrkamp), 2008. We refer here largely to the synthesis developed at the Leipzig Colloquium on "*The 68s: events, political cultures and ways of life*": 1968 seen from Germany, in *Lettre d'information du Centre Franco-Allemand Berlin*, No. 9 on the session of May 15, 1995, pp. 3-14; https://sirice.eu/sites/default/files/pdf_lettre_9_gilcher.pdf (Retrieved on March 1, 2021). We are also inspired by the comparative study of Christiane Kohser-Spohn: *Mouvement antiautoritaire en Allemagne et mouvement contestataire en France: interactions?* in *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*, 2009/2, n° 94, (pp. 33-38), paragraphs 1-2;

<https://www.cairn.info/revue-materiaux-pour-l-histoire-de-notre-temps-2009-2-page-33.htm>.

On the contestation and *counter-culture* of the 1960s at the international level, see especially Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand, Robert Frank, Marie-Françoise Lévy, Michelle Zancarini-Fournel (dir.): *Les Années 68. Le temps de la contestation*, Brussels (Éditions Complexe/IHTP), 2000.

8. The rapid growth is attributed in particular to the massive aid of the Marshall Plan, the currency reform of 1948 introducing the Deutsche Mark, full employment, long working hours and the arrival of foreign labour in the early 1960s.

9. For an overview of the theories in vogue in the protest movement, see, among others, Stephano Petrucciani: *La théorie critique de l'école de Francfort et le mouvement des années 1968 : un rapport complexe*, in *Actuel Marx* 2010/2 (n° 48), p. 138-151 ; <https://www.cairn.info/revue-actuel-marx-2010-2-page-138.htm> (Retrieved on February 20, 2021). On the experiences in the universities, see in particular Stéphane Pihet: *La révolte des étudiants berlinois, processus de politisation de la pratique des savoirs*, *Cahiers du GRM* (Groupe de recherches matérialistes) 4/2013 ; <http://journals.openedition.org/grm/312> (Retrieved on March 10, 2021)

10. See, among others, Peter-Paul Bänziger, Magdalena Beljan, Franz. X. Eder, Pascal Eitler (Hrsg.): *Sexuelle Revolution? Zur Geschichte der Sexualität im deutschsprachigen Raum seit den 1960er Jahren*, Bielefeld (transcript Verlag), 2015

11. On the generation conflict, see, among others, Christiane Kohser-Spohn: *Mouvement étudiant et critique du fascisme en Allemagne*, Paris (Editions L'Harmattan), 2000

12. Nicole Gabriel: *Etat de droit, violence et poésie dans l'Allemagne des années de plomb. L'exemple de Peter-Paul-Zahl*, in: Gius Gargiulo, Otmar Seul op. cit. (pp.122-149), p. 133 ff; see also p. 147 note 54

13. Cf. *ibid*, with a reference to the analysis of the philosopher Oskar Negt, a major figure in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School: *Interessen gegen Partei. Identitätsprobleme in der deutschen Linken*, in *Kursbuch* no.48, 1977, pp. 175-188

14. Wolfgang Kraushaar: *A l'ombre de la Fraction Armée Rouge : genèse des cellules révolutionnaires*, in Gius Gargiulo, Otmar Seul op. cit. (pp. 105-121) p.108 ff.

15. This is the case, for example, of Gerhart Schröder, the future Chancellor of a united Germany (1998-2005), who began his activism within the SPD, in the *Young Socialists* group (Jusos)

16. Dieter Kunzelmann: *'Leisten Sie keinen Widerstand'. Bilder aus meinem Leben*, Berlin (Transit) 1998, quoted from Wolfgang Kraushaar, op. cit. p. 108 ff.

17. Ulrike Meinhof, Statement at trial (1974); quoted from <https://lesmaterialistes.com/contre-informations/ulrike-meinhof-dirigeante-communiste-ete-assassine-30-ans>, May 9, 2006 (submitted by Anonyme) (Retrieved on March 5, 2021)

18. See Otmar Seul op. cit. p. 31 ff. On the history of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, see the comprehensive study by Wolfgang Kraushaar: *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus*, 2 vol., Hamburg (Hamburger Edition) 2006.

19. Cf. Otmar Seul op. cit. p. 31 ff. This correlation may be surprising because there seems to

be only a chronological coincidence - between the explosion of the student revolt on June 2, 1967 in West Berlin and the Six-Day War led by Israel against Egypt from June 5 to 10, 1967. For Wolfgang Kraushaar, these two "very different events" mark the birth of the student movement in the Federal Republic as well as that of the Palestinian armed resistance, from which several terrorist organisations were born, such as the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (PFLP) created in December 1967 by Dr Georges Habache. The *Six Day War*, it is true, considerably modified the relationship of the SDS with the State of Israel. In September 1967, the 22nd assembly of its delegates considered that "only the constitution of a revolutionary socialist movement aiming at triumphing over imperialism and the borders it has drawn, as well as the building of a unitary Arab socialist Republic, which, through a common policy with a socialist State of Israel, will lead to territorial integrity, can bring lasting peace to the Middle East". Just as it played a pioneering role in the early 1950s, when it was still close to the SPD, in seeking redress for the Nazi crimes against the Jewish people and recognition of the State of Israel, the SDS is now taking on the role of a vanguard for the Palestinians in their struggle for an independent State.

20. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey: 1968 vu d'Allemagne, op. cit p. 5

21. Christiane Kohser-Spohn: Mouvement antiautoritaire en Allemagne et mouvement contestataire en France, op. cit. paragraphe 5

22. Ibid.

23. As the Netherlands, like other Western countries, experienced unprecedented economic growth in the 1960s, the anarchist, libertarian and ecologist-inspired *provos* (provocateurs) attacked the 'consumer-people' and opposed them to the 'provotariat', which carried the seeds of a counter-culture: students, artists, beatniks, and outsiders. Far from the Marxist scheme of *class struggle*, they rejected industrial society in the West as well as in the East, with its pyramidal organisation, in favour of a so-called 'playful' society, where the creative virtualities of each individual were exercised in a sort of *permanent revolution* in play. The movement is constituted as an informal anti-authoritarian network and offers to awaken individual and collective consciousness (notably through graffiti, leaflets and happenings). Representing a form of global protest, its demonstrations were punctuated in 1965/1966 by violent clashes with the police in Amsterdam. The *provos* inspired both the European and American counter-culture and the militant current of May '68 and the student protest in Milan and Prague.

24. Hervé Hamon, Patrick Rotman: Génération, tome 1: Les années de rêve, Paris (Le Seuil), 1987, p. 416 ff.

25. Christiane Kohser-Spohn: Mouvement antiautoritaire en Allemagne et mouvement contestataire en France, op. cit, paragraphes 1-2

26. Among the most spectacular joint demonstrations were the anti-nuclear actions at Fessenheim in Alsace, Wyhl in Baden in 1974 and Malville in 1977. But it was the feminists who were the first to strike by the consistency of their commitments. Under the impetus of the Women's Liberation Movement (MLF), they demanded the free disposal of women's bodies as early as 1968 and questioned patriarchal society. In 1971, they raised awareness in their countries with a major media coup: the "Manifesto of the 343", a petition published in the magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur*, served as a model for a vast signature campaign against anti-abortion laws in the Federal Republic in the weekly magazine *Stern*.

27. *Mouvement antiautoritaire en Allemagne et mouvement contestataire en France*, op. cit.

Paragraphs 7 ff. of his study serve - together with Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey's analysis - as a line of thought for chapter 2.1.

28. Renan Le Mestre: Les pouvoirs exceptionnels du président du Reich en vertu de l'article 48 de la constitution de Weimar. De la protection à la subversion de l'ordre constitutionnel, in *Revue historique de droit français et étranger* (Ed. Dalloz), vol. 89, no. 1, January-March 2011 (pp.81-102), p. 81

29. Henry Rousso: Le régime de Vichy, Introduction (pp. 3-6), Paris (Que sais-je ?) 2007, p. 3

30. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey: 1968 vu d'Allemagne, op. cit. p. 11

31. Ibid. p. 10.

32. Roger Martelli: Communistes en 1968, le grand malentendu, Paris (Les Editions sociales), 2018 – interview with Mathieu Dejean, May 20, 2018, in *Les Inrockuptibles*, <https://www.lesinrocks.com/2018/05/20/actualite/politique/les-communistes-sont-ils-vraiment-passes-cote-de-mai-68> (Retrieved on March 11, 2021); see also Michel Maffesoli: Mai 68, événement ou avènement, in *Le Point.fr* of April 2, 2018, https://www.lepoint.fr/debats/mai-68-evenement-ou-avenement-31-03-2018-2207091_2.php (Retrieved on July 20, 2021)

33. Michel Winock: La fièvre hexagonale. Les grandes crises politiques de 1871 à 1968, Paris, (Calmann-Lévy) 1986 in: *La Dépêche* of April 18, 2008 (AFP), <https://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2008/04/18/449593-le-mai-68-francais-heritage-d-une-tradition-revolutionnaire.html> (Retrieved on March 11, 2021)

34. See Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey: 1968 vu d'Allemagne, op. cit. p. 9

35. On the reception of the idea of *self-management* by French trade unionism since *May 68*, see Otmar Seul: *Arbeitnehmerpartizipation im Urteil der französischen Gewerkschaften. Sozialreformen unter der Präsidentschaft François Mitterrands (1982-1985)*, Saarbrücken (Südwestdeutscher Verlag für Hochschulschriften) 2012 (reprint of the 1986 doctoral thesis, University of Oldenburg).

36. Roger Martelli op.cit.

37. Ibid.

38. It was not until August 4, 1982, under the presidency of the socialist François Mitterrand, that the *Auroux laws* granted employees a "right to direct and collective expression on the content and organisation of their work". On the reception of this law on "workers' freedoms in the enterprise" by the trade unions, see Otmar Seul: *Arbeitnehmerpartizipation*, op.cit.

39. At the Sorbonne, May 20, 1968, quoted from Jean Claude Kerbourc'h: *Le piéton de Mai*, Paris (Julliard) 1968, see <https://www.histoire-en-citations.fr/citations/sartre-les-fils-de-la-bourgeoisie-s-unissent-aux-ouvriers> (Retrieved on July 21, 2021)

40. Christiane Kohser-Spohn: *Mouvement antiautoritaire en Allemagne et mouvement contestataire en France*, op. cit, paragraph 8

41. Ibid.

42. Igor Krtolica: Herbert Marcuse, thinker of the German student revolt, *Cahiers du GRM* 2012 no. 3; online, May 29, 2012; URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/grm/282>; DOI:

<https://doi.org/10.4000/grm.282> (Retrieved on March 11, 2021)

43. Christiane Kohser-Spohn: Mouvement antiautoritaire en Allemagne et mouvement contestataire en France, op. cit, paragraph 11

44. Quoted from Christiane Kohser-Spohn *ibid.* paragraph 12

45. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey: 1968 vu d'Allemagne, op. cit. p. 10

46. Georges Séguy, his General Secretary, quoted from *Obs*, May 14, 2008, <https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/le-quotidien-de-1968/20080514.OBS3843/seguy-l-autogestion-est-une-formule-creuse.html> (Retrieved on March 13, 2021)

47. Frank Georgi: L'autogestion, utopie libertaire ou utopie libérale? in Michel Margairaz, Danielle Tartakowsky: 1968, entre libération et libéralisation, Rennes (Presses universitaires de Rennes), 2010, p. 318; <https://books.openedition.org/pur/101994?lang=fr> (Retrieved on March 20, 2021)

48. Michel Maffesoli op. cit.

49. Cf. Dominique David, Hans Stark: Cinquante ans après mai 68 – où en sont les gauches en France et en Allemagne? in *Germany Today* 2018/4 (No. 226: pages 100 - 110), <https://www.cairn.info/revue-alle-magne-d-aujourd-hui-2018-4-page-100.htm>, paragraph 12 (Retrieved on July 21, 2021)

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